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Abstract. Many sociological works appear as being particularly illuminating, i.e. as 
able to explain puzzling social phenomena, because they follow three basic rules 
common to all scientiic disciplines. These rules are at the root of the sociologi-
cal paradigm becoming popular today in Europe under the label “analytical socio-
logy”. But they identify a stream of sociological research that appeared notably with 
Weber’s and Durkheim’s work. These three rules are to a great extent responsible 
for the scientiic strength of their respective work. They are crucial notably as far as 
the sociological explanation of collective beliefs, both representational and norma-
tive, is concerned, as examples drawn from the work of classical and modern social 
scientists illustrate. A special attention will be given to the beliefs that give a strong 
feeling of strangeness and for this reason were explored by many sociologists and 
anthropologists, as the beliefs in the eficiency of magical rituals. 
Keywords : collective beliefs, methodological singularism, methodological individualism, 
ordinary rationality, cognitive equilibrium principle.
Résumé. Nombre de travaux sociologiques sont d’autant plus éclairants qu’ils se 
montrent capables d’expliquer des phénomènes sociaux énigmatiques en s’atta-
chant à suivre trois règles communes à toutes les disciplines scientiiques. Ces règles 
sont à la racine du paradigme popularisé aujourd’hui en Europe sous l’étiquette de la 
« sociologie analytique ». Cependant, elles identiient un courant de recherche illus-
tré en particulier par les œuvres de Weber et de Durkheim. Ces trois règles sont en 
effet largement responsables de la puissance scientiique de leur œuvre respective. 
Elles s’avèrent cruciales dès lors qu’il s’agit d’expliquer des croyances collectives, 
tant représentationnelles que normatives, ainsi que l’illustrent des exemples tirés 
de l’œuvre de sociologues classiques et modernes. On accordera une attention 
particulière aux croyances provoquant un fort sentiment d’étrangeté, comme celles 
relatives à l’eficacité des rituels magiques, qui furent pour cette raison explorées par 
de nombreux sociologues et anthropologues.
Mots-clés : croyances collectives, singularisme méthodologique, individualisme méthodo-
logique, rationalité ordinaire, principe de l’équilibre cognitif.
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In the 1980’s a book on sociology had a tremendous success in sociological 
circles, Wolf Lepenies’ Drei Kulturen (1985). It was quickly translated into the 
main European languages. It defended two theses: that sociology is neither 
science nor literature, but a “third culture” and that the great classical sociolo-
gists had been wrong when they maintained that sociology could be a science 
as any other. But the book was possibly inspired by the actual state of socio-
logy at the time when it was published, in the 1980’s, for, at that time, two 
trends in the social sciences, constructivism and structuralism, drew a great 
deal of attention, but had diametrically opposed orientations: skepticism inspi-
red constructivism, while scientism inspired structuralism. Today, a new cycle 
seems to me to be opened with the birth of the so-called “analytical sociology” 
(see e.g. Hedström, 2005; Manzo, 2010).
A comment on the back of the collective book edited by Pierre Demeulenaere 
under the title Analytical sociology and social mechanisms claims that analytical socio-
logy is simply “good sociology”, suggesting that “analytical sociology” is essen-
tially a reaction against the high degree of diversity that characterizes sociology 
since, say, the 1960’s (Demeulenaere, 2010). I think “analytical sociology” is 
efectively the symptom of the end of the neither-science-nor-literature cycle 
and that it retrieves the ambitions of classical sociologists, i.e. making sociology 
a science like any other.
I will attempt in the following to develop two theses: irstly, that many socio-
logical works considered as genuine scientiic achievements follow three rules 
common to all scientiic disciplines; secondly, that these rules are at the roots 
of the so-called “analytical sociology”. Given the general topic of this meeting, I 
will concentrate on the importance of these rules for the explanation of beliefs, 
both normative and representational, since they raise the same questions.
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1. METHODOLOGICAL SINGULARISM
Émile Durkheim, the sociologist whom all handbooks consider with 
Max Weber as the father of sociology raises in his Suicide a number of questions 
dealing all with singular social phenomena: why are the suicide rates of women 
lower than the suicide rates of men? Why are the suicide rates of Protestants higher 
than the suicide rates of Catholics? Why are the suicide rates of bachelors higher 
than the suicide rates of married people? Once he had succeeded explaining these 
and other singular phenomena, Durkheim attempted to synthesize his explana-
tions in the broader theoretical framework of his three – or four – types of suicide. 
Explanations of a host of intriguing phenomena characterize in the same 
way Max Weber’s work. Thus, he wonders in his Old Judaism why Pharisians 
believed in the immortality of the soul, while Sadducees did not. Elsewhere, 
in his short essay on protestant sects in America, he wonders why Americans 
are much more religious than Englishmen, Germans or Frenchmen and disco-
vered a cause which earlier analysts of the American religious exceptionalism, 
as Adam Smith or Tocqueville, had missed. The accumulation of the nume-
rous explanations of these and many other puzzling singular religious pheno-
mena he gathers in his Essays in the sociology of religions, proposes on the whole, 
as Durkheim’s Elementary forms of religious life, a new way of explaining religious 
phenomena (Weber, 1986 [1920]; Durkheim, 1979 [1912]).
The great Austrian economist Ludwig von Mises has coined the notion 
of “methodological singularism” to christen the rule according to which 
a scientiic explanation can bear exclusively on singular phenomena 
(von Mises, 1949). He wanted to distinguish by so doing explanation and interpre-
tation. Thus, a complex sequence of events as, say, the 1789 French Revolution, 
can be “interpreted” rather than properly “explained”, because it is by essence 
ill-deined. To begin with, nobody knows when it ended. To many historians, 
it ended with Bonaparte taking the power in 1800. To François Furet, it ended 
in 1870 with the Parisian Commune. Before von Mises, Georg Simmel had 
also made in a great book the point that some topics can give birth to interpre-
tations, others to explanations (Simmel, 1892). Thus, there can be no unique inal 
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biography of historical major igures because a biography rests always upon 
a selection and diferential weighting of some facts among a huge number of 
facts, the selection and weighting depending upon the sensitiveness of the 
historian himself and of his time. By contrast, there can be a unique expla-
nation of a singular phenomenon as to why women commit less frequently 
suicide than men in given conjunctures or why Americans are more religious 
than Europeans. In a word, to von Mises, methodological singularism is a 
necessary condition of scientiic explanation.
This rule applies, not only to sociology, but to all social sciences. That an 
Austrian economist coined the notion of “methodological singularism” can 
easily be understood. At the end of the 19th century, German and Austrian 
economists gave the impression of living in distinct intellectual worlds. To 
the German historical school and its main igure Gustav Schmoller, the main 
objective of economics was to describe the history of economic institutions. 
The members of the school had little consideration for the young Austrian who 
was rather concerned with explaining singular economic phenomena. The 
conlict has given birth to a quarrel, a Methodenstreit, which remained famous in 
the history of economic ideas.
On the side of sociology, the history of the Frankfurt school illustrates the 
same intellectual quarrel, as a meaningful anecdote drawn from Wiggershaus’ 
monograph on the school shows (Wiggershaus, 1995). In the 1930’s, several 
members of the Frankfurt school leave Germany and try to get settled in the 
American academic world. Max Horkheimer, a leading igure of the school, 
proposes to develop an ambitious social Theory, which he insists to describe 
with a capital T, a practice usual in German but strange in English, so that 
the American academic authorities are reluctant to accept his project. He 
was eiciently helped though by a young Austrian sociologist by the name of 
Paul Lazarsfeld. But as soon as the two had succeeded being recognized by the 
American academic world, they could not help expressing the deep intellectual 
disrespect they felt for one another. The main reason is that Lazarsfeld endorsed 
“methodological singularism”, while Horkheimer’s Grand theory rejected it.
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2. CLASSICAL SOCIOLOGISTS 
ENDORSED METHODOLOGICAL SINGULARISM
By endorsing, if not the word, at least the principle “methodological singu-
larism”, the founding fathers of sociology were aware that they followed a prin-
ciple governing all scientiic disciplines. Thus, in his current work, a biologist 
deals normally with singular phenomena, as when he explores the behavior 
of some virus. He feels certainly concerned with broader questions, as of the 
origin or essence of life, but they do not directly constitute his research goal. 
Max Weber follows the same principle as the biologist when he explains for 
instance why Pharisians believed in the soul immortality while Sadducees did not. 
This comes from the fact, he explains, that Pharisians were mainly shopkeepers 
and businessmen. To them, the notion of the equity of exchanges was a professio-
nally crucial value. Consequently, the idea that the actions of people on this earth 
would be equitably rewarded after the physical death of the body, was palatable 
to them. Sadducees were by contrast a category from which the political and reli-
gious elites were drawn. To them, the notion of the immortality of the soul did 
not make sense. They tended to see it as a strange idea imported from abroad, 
presumably from India. Before Weber, Benjamin Constant and Tocqueville 
(1986 [1840], p. 527) had explained the Indian belief in reincarnation in the same 
way: as a symbolic expression of the idea that in the long run, at the end of the 
cycle of reincarnations, good and bad behavior will be equitably rewarded.
I felt necessary to insist on the fact that the founding fathers endorsed the 
“methodological singularism” principle, because a number of sociologists do 
not follow it. To mention two contemporary examples, the German sociologist 
Ulrich Beck (1992), never cares explaining singular puzzling social facts, but is 
rather concerned with characterizing the main features of modern societies: they 
would be risky societies, Risikogesellschaften. In the same way, the polish-english 
sociologist Zygmunt Bauman describes modern societies as “liquid”, as societies 
that would have lost any ixed point (Bauman, 2008). Earlier, Gustave Le Bon 
reached an audience that Weber or Durkheim have never reached, because he 
described the societies of his time as characterized by what he pictured as a new 
phenomenon, the reign of the “crowds” (Le Bon, 1895).
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3. METHODOLOGICAL INDIVIDUALISM
So, methodological singularism is the irst rule common to all scientiic expla-
nations in the social sciences. Max Weber and Schumpeter, who recalls in 
his History of economic analysis that Weber had employed him for a while, identi-
ied a second rule. They called it “methodological individualism”. Authors as 
Popper and Hayek then popularized the notion. Max Weber saw “methodo-
logical individualism” as the basic principle of what he called “comprehen-
sive sociology”: “comprehensive sociology, in the way I take this expression, 
considers the isolated individual and his action as its ultimate unity, as its 
‘atom’” (die verstehende Soziologie, in unserem Sinne, behandelt das Einzelindividuum und sein 
Handeln als unterste Einheit, als ihr ‘Atom’) (Weber, 1965 [1922], p. 415). Weber’s 
text could not be clearer: it indicates that “methodological individualism” is 
the basic principle of “comprehensive sociology”, because individual actions 
are the only possible causes of social phenomena. Unfortunately, handbooks 
often interpret wrongly “methodological individualism” as ignoring that 
social actors are embedded in institutions and social structures. The propo-
nents of “analytical sociology” possibly decided to create a new word notably 
to neutralize this frequent misunderstanding.
It should be noted that the notion of “comprehensive sociology” itself was 
also and is still often misunderstood. Weber makes this clear through the care-
ful parenthesis he introduces in the previous quotation: he writes “compre-
hensive sociology, in the way I take this expression”, because he was aware 
that many social scientists gave the same expression a holistic rather than indi-
vidualistic meaning. Even today, some handbooks characterize as “compre-
hensive” the type of holistic work that attempts at describing, say, the features 
characteristic of given societies or eras, as Dilthey and Burckhardt in the past or 
Ulrich Beck and Zygmunt Baumann nowadays. A history of the misunderstan-
dings around the notions of “understanding” (Verstehen) and “methodological 
individualism” remains to be written!
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Against these misunderstandings, Weber defended clearly the idea that 
explaining singular social phenomena was the natural objective of sociology 
and that, as social phenomena can again have no other causes but human indi-
vidual actions, explaining them implies determining the causes of these indivi-
dual actions. This is exactly what Weber does when he explains why Pharisians 
believed in the immortality of the soul and why Sadducees did not. The causes 
of this macroscopic diference lies in the causes that made that ideal-typical 
Pharisians were likely to ind the idea palatable, while the Sadducees were not. 
This analysis does not imply that the concrete individuals would have clearly 
perceived the reasons that led their attitude toward the question. Such reasons 
are rather metaconscious than conscious. But they are not unconscious, in the sense that 
actors can more or less easily retrieve them.
Before going further, I would like to make clear that, against the views 
defended by many handbooks, Durkheim endorsed implicitly also the prin-
ciple of methodological individualism, notwithstanding his more or less 
obscure statements on the relations between the individual and social levels, 
in modern vocabulary: on the micro-macro link (Borlandi, 2011). His state-
ments on the subject have by far not the clarity of Weber’s. But, while his 
theoretical developments are obscure and probably inspired to some extent 
by his goal to impose sociology as a new discipline sui generis, his empirical 
analyses lean upon a conception of the micro-macro link similar to Weber’s. 
Thus, in his Suicide, he explains the macroscopic fact that Protestant commit 
more frequently suicide than Catholics by introducing the assumption that 
ideal-typical Catholics are led by moral principles imposed by the Roman 
Church, while Protestant have to devise by themselves the moral principles 
they should follow by disentangling the messages of the Holy Scriptures 
under their own responsibility, so that they are more likely exposed to doubt 
and anxiety when existential problems confront them and hence more likely 
to ind in suicide a solution to their problems. 
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Or, to take an example drawn from Durkheim’s last book on the Elementary 
forms of religious life, he explains the fact that the notion of the “soul” is both 
universal and highly resilient, by contrast with other religious notions, by 
showing that the notion has a clear symbolic meaning for any individual in 
any society. In any society, he claims, any individual has the strong feeling 
that some types of behavior are legitimate or not, good or evil. In our modern 
nietzschean vocabulary, any individual has a sense of values. Moreover, he has 
the feeling that the values that he endorses are a basic component of his self, 
but that he has not devised them. He sees that they come from the outside. 
Consequently, he cannot avoid experiencing a strong feeling of the duality of 
his self. To Durkheim, the notion of the “soul” should inally be interpreted 
as a symbolic expression of this duality. Contemporary sociologists of religion, 
as Thomas Luckman (1967), have conirmed this explanation. I have perso-
nally shown that modern empirical research conirm Durkheim’s thesis. The 
World values survey (Inglehart, 1998) shows that, while people become in most 
countries more and more skeptical about religions, their dogmas and concepts, 
the notion of the soul appears as highly resilient (Boudon, 2012a and b). 
I could also have taken examples from Durkheim’s Division of Labor. We 
observe a secular trend toward a substitution of civil for penal judiciary sanc-
tions and toward increasingly lenient sanctions because the ideal-typical citizen 
tends to prefer less heavy sanctions as soon as they appear as equally eicient. 
Unfortunately, handbooks retain only from Durkheim’s analysis that the increase 
in the social “density” and in the “division of labor” facilitates this process.
This second rule is the socialscientiic version of a general rule valid for 
all sciences. When a biologist, say, observes a correlation between the regular 
consumption of some food and the frequency of some disease, he will look for 
the elementary mechanisms responsible for the correlation. Methodological 
individualism recommends in the same way to explore the elementary indi-
vidual microscopic causes responsible for the macroscopic social phenomena.
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4. COMPREHENSION AS 
AN OPEN CONCEPTION OF RATIONALITY
The notion of “comprehension” (Verstehen) was limited in Weber’s mind to 
the explanation of individual actions. It encapsulates the third essential prin-
ciple underlying the vision Weber and also Durkheim notably had of sociology 
as a science. To them, the causes explaining that any ideal-typical individual 
behaves the way he does or believes what he believes lie exclusively in the 
reasons as to why the individual behaves the way he does or believes what 
he believes. More precisely, an ideal-typical individual endorses some belief 
as soon as he has the impression that his belief is grounded on a system of 
reasons arousing in his mind the impression that they are acceptable and that 
he fails to see an alternative system that would lead to a diferent belief. It 
should also be immediately added that these reasons are in the general case 
parameterized by the context. As we recall, the Sadducees had not the same 
reasons as the Pharisians to believe in the immortality of the soul.
Durkheim is even more explicit that Weber on this point. One of the basic 
postulates of his explanation of religious beliefs is that people believe what 
they believe because they have strong reasons to believe it. He is very criti-
cal against the sociologists of his time who, as Max Müller or Lévy-Bruhl, 
analyze religious or magical beliefs as illusions generated in the mind of people 
by occult social or psychological forces. He is very ironical against the idea 
that beliefs can be explained as illusions. When a young child plays with his 
puppet, the observer has easily the impression that the child believes that his 
puppet is alive. But the child would be surprised if the puppet would suddenly 
bite him. Even a cat, adds Durkheim, understands very quickly that a ball is 
not a mouse. He plays a while with it, but quickly leaves it, for he understands 
that it is not a mouse. Durkheim would certainly have vehemently rejected the 
Marxist idea that consciousness would be basically “false”, i.e. that social actors 
would be blind on the reasons as to why they do what they do or believe what 
they believe, an idea the sociologists of the structural school treat as a postu-
late. As Jean-Daniel Reynaud (2002) has claimed, the objective of sociology 
would have been according e.g. to Pierre Bourdieu to “deliver to human beings 
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the genuine meaning of their actions” (Redonner aux hommes le sens de leurs actes). To 
Weber and Durkheim, actors are only half conscious of the reasons inspiring 
them because they normally concentrate on the goals rather than on the moti-
vations of their action. This trivial observation is far from the postulate Marx, 
Mehring, Mannheim follow and that Bourdieu has taken literally that people 
would systematically endorse false representations of their motivations and 
reasons under the efect of the social structures.
A simple example from Weber will illustrate the idea that beliefs should 
rather be explained by the reasons that, given the context, individuals have to 
endorse them. Thus, an ideal-typical Western individual is surprised by the fact 
that “primitive” people seem to believe that their rain rituals are able to produce 
rain, but not by the fact that they rub pieces of wood against one another to 
produce ire. This can be explained by the context: a typical modern Westerner 
is more or less aware of the laws of the transformation of energy and notably 
of the fact that kinetic energy can be transformed into thermic energy. For this 
reason, the primitive iremaker does not surprise him, but he sees the beliefs 
of the rainmaker as strange. As to the “primitive” himself, he has no reasons, 
claims Weber in his Economy and Society, to make this diference: he sees his rain-
making and iremaking practices as equally grounded in theories in which he 
believes but that ideal-typical Westerners spontaneously see as “magical”.
In this simple example, Weber introduces implicitly a powerful theory of 
rationality. This theory breaks with the current view on rationality by making 
the point that rationality should be seen as cognitive rather than instrumental. The 
example conveys in other words the crucial idea that explaining – understanding 
– an individual act, belief or behavior means determining the reasons that have 
inspired the act, belief or behavior in the mind of the individual, given that deci-
phering these reasons implies that the observer should be aware of the relevant 
features of the social and cognitive context in which the individual is embedded. 
I have personally proposed to formalize Weber’s theory of rationality 
and called it the Theory of ordinary rationality, in order to distinguish it from the 
so-called Rational choice theory, the theory of rationality most currently accepted 
today in the social sciences. The diference between the two is that the Rational 
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choice theory introduces the idea that the reasons moving social actors would be 
basically egoistic and instrumental, while the Theory of ordinary rationality claims 
that they can be egoistic but also impersonal and not only instrumental, but 
also cognitive. Thus, the reasons explaining that Westerners perceive the beha-
vior of primitive rainmakers as strange but not the behavior of iremakers are 
cognitive and not instrumental, impersonal and in no way egoistic. 
As it claims a competence limited to the explanation of the means people 
use to reach their goals, the Rational choice theory sufers from a major shortco-
ming: it is doomed to explain the objectives, values and beliefs of people by 
postulating the existence of conjectural causes operating in the back of their 
minds. Rational choice theorists call generally these conjectural causes frames or 
frameworks. But the same explanatory scheme can be found behind many other 
notions as mentality (as in the example of Lévy-Bruhl’s primitive mentality), habitus, 
etc. Some social scientists treat these causes as mere data, while others propose 
to derive them from psychological, social or biological mechanisms that are 
themselves in most cases highly conjectural. For this reason, Popper (1976) has 
convincingly argued that, as long as the social sciences will insist using such 
conjectural notions, they will necessarily stand on clay feet.
A clear distinction should be made in this respect between dispositional 
variables, as primitive mentality or habitus, which provide generally ad hoc pseudo 
explanations of behavior and the parameters describing the context of beha-
vior. That the “primitive” do not know the laws of the transformation of 
energy is a parameter distinguishing his context from the observer’s context. 
That early Christians did not make a distinction between natural and super-
natural phenomena is a parameter distinguishing their context from the new 
context created by the notion that laws govern natural phenomena. Such para-
meters are empirical data, while dispositional variables are intrinsically conjectural 
and ad hoc constructs. Coleman’s (1990) famous “boat” fails to make this crucial 
distinction, as it collapses the two categories into the single “individual atti-
tudes / dispositions”. Dispositions do exist of course, but their efect on beha-
vior is highly unpredictable. As Simmel (1892) has well seen, an authorita-
rian education can produce a liberal or an authoritarian personality. Empirical 
18 Raymond Boudon : “Analytical sociology” and the explanation of beliefs 
studies conirm that the relations between dispositions and behavior are weak 
and variable from one study to the other. A great lesson to be derived from 
Weber’s analyses is that he practically never mobilizes dispositional variables. 
In fact, dispositional variables have been included into the sociologist’s toolbox 
under the inluence of behaviorism, an intellectual move that was considered 
as able to make psychology a hard science.
The Theory of ordinary rationality I propose to derive from Weber’s work 
rests inally upon a basic principle I propose to call the cognitive equilibrium prin-
ciple. It says that people believe that X is true, acceptable, good, legitimate, etc. 
as soon as they have the feeling that X rests upon a set of acceptable reasons.
Beside methodological singularism and methodological individualism, the cognitive equili-
brium principle is inally the third principle I see as deining implicitly the paradigm 
used by the founding fathers as well as by many modern sociologists, a paradigm 
deining actually the core of the contemporary so-called “analytical sociology”.
5. NETWORKS AND THE GENERALIZED OTHERS 
The third principle excludes by principle the model of a solipsistic social 
actor, since an individual tends to perceive the reasons grounding his beliefs 
as valid only if he has the impression these reasons would likely be shared. I 
have proposed to qualify these reasons as transsubjective. The idea that the reasons 
motivating a belief in the individual’s mind appear to him as valid only if he 
has the impression they would be shared provides a formal deinition of the 
famous notion of the generalized others (Mead, 1934) that gives often birth to rather 
obscure comments in the presentation of Mead’s writings. In plain words, while 
the Rational choice theory introduces the iction of a solipsistic homo sociologicus, the 
Theory of ordinary rationality recognizes the homo sociologicus as a social being.
Incident remark: Networks are today a popular topic of sociologi-
cal research. But they are often treated in a mere descriptive or mechanical 
fashion, while a connection with the Theory of ordinary rationality would 
make network research more fruitful, as many classical and modern sociologi-
cal works suggest. Tocqueville has written: “we believe a million of things on 
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the faith of other people” (Nous croyons un million de choses sur la foi d’autrui). In many 
cases, as soon as a friend or neighbor appears to us as credible, we choose to be 
inluenced by his judgment on issues on which we see him as more competent 
or better informed. Lazarsfeld’s two-step low of communication illustrates this idea 
(Katz and Lazarsfeld, 1955). It is at the core of studies as Coleman’s et al. (1966) 
on medical innovation or Manzo’s (2009) on educational inequalities. 
6. ILLUSTRATIONS
In the following, I will try to suggest by examples taken from various ields 
that the three-rule paradigm characterizing implicitly “analytical sociology”, 
methodological singularism, methodological individualism and the cognitive equilibrium principle 
is a theoretical framework within which all kinds of phenomena of interest to 
the social sciences can be explained and have actually been explained. 
I will consider successively examples where the social phenomena to be 
explained are representational beliefs, normative beliefs, long term and middle 
term trends, and practical solutions to classical interaction dilemmas, as the 
Prisoner’s dilemma. I will also try to show by these examples, that although 
“analytical sociology” is a new expression, it is actually old wine in new bottles, 
since it essentially revitalizes the principles more or less implicitly used by clas-
sical sociologists, notably by Weber and Durkheim. 
6.1. REPRESENTATIONAL BELIEFS
An example from Weber will illustrate the application of the three prin-
ciples at the root of the “analytical sociology” paradigm -as I deine it- to the 
explanation of representational beliefs.
Why, asked Weber, did the monotheistic cults imported from the Middle 
East, as Mithraism, attracted the Roman civil servants and army oicers, while 
the Roman peasants felt deeply hostile to these cults and remained faithful to 
the traditional polytheistic Roman religion? Their hostility to Christianity was 
so deep that the word paganus – peasant – turned out to be used by Christians 
to describe the unbelievers: the heathens.
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Weber explains the hostility of peasants against Christianity in the following 
way: peasants had trouble accepting monotheism because the uncertainty 
characteristic of natural phenomena, which is an essential dimension of their 
everyday life, did not seem to them compatible with the idea that the order of 
things could be subjected to a single will: a notion which implies a minimal 
degree of coherence and predictability. So, the basic reason why the peasants 
rejected monotheism, beside of course other more or less contingent factors, is 
that the Roman peasants, as good followers, so to say, of Popper’s falsiication 
theory, had the impression that the monotheistic theory was incompatible with 
data familiar to them. This analysis explains also that an impressive body of 
saints appeared in the early centuries of our age in the Christian world. Thanks 
to the saints, Christianity became more palatable to peasants, since they made it 
a polytheistic religion. The army oicers and civil servants had by contrast the 
feeling that Mithraism and then Christianity expressed symbolically the basic 
principles on which the political organization of the Roman Empire rested. 
6.2. BELIEFS IN THE EFFICIENCY OF MAGICAL RITUAL 
AS A PRODUCT OF ORDINARY RATIONALITY
I will use an example from Durkheim as a second illustration of the three-
rule paradigm. It has the advantage of being particularly brilliant, and also to 
show that Durkheim and Weber followed the same principles. Parsons had 
incidentally the powerful and right intuition of a strong convergence of the 
work of the two great founding fathers when he tried in his Structure of social 
action to ground sociology on a synthesis essentially of their works, and secon-
darily on Pareto’s and Alfred Marshall’s works.
The example of the beliefs in magical techniques has also the inte-
rest that the topic has inspired three canonical explanations. First type of 
theory: Ludwig Wittgenstein (1967) claims that people do not really believe 
that magical rituals can be efective. By practicing rain rituals, people would 
simply express their desire that rain falls on their crops. Second type of 
theory: Following Auguste Comte’s lead, Lévy-Bruhl (1922) has contended 
that magical beliefs would derive from the fact that in the early ages men 
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would have been less sensitive to logical contradictions or would not have 
made a clear distinction between relations of similarity and of causality. 
They would for instance have believed for this reason that hurting the puppet 
representing one’s enemy would hurt him. With other words, Beattie (1964), 
Needham (1972) or Sahlins (1995) have followed Lévy-Bruhl’s lead. They state 
that rationality is culture-dependent: people in traditional societies would 
believe in magical rituals because they would follow rules of inference dife-
rent from the Western rules. The rules of inference Westerners consider 
universal would be in fact characteristic of Western culture. Third type of 
theory: Durkheim (1912), Weber (1986 [1920]), or today Robin Horton (1993), 
claim that magical rituals are the outcome of what I call ordinary rationality. 
Wittgenstein’s theory is incompatible with many observations. Thus, 
Africans believe in magical practices even after they have been converted to 
Christianity (Horton, 1993). When asked why, they answer that Christianity 
has the shortcoming of proposing no magical remedies against the evils of 
everyday life, while the animistic religion they come from ofer such reme-
dies. This observation is obviously incompatible with the assumption that 
they would not believe in the efectiveness of magical practices. Moreover, 
the believers in magical practices reject without hesitation the idea that they 
would have a mere expressive function. 
As to Lévy-Bruhl’s theory and its variants that see the rules of inference as 
culture-dependent, they use a very conjectural, if not merely ad hoc assumption. 
Durkheim’s (1979, [1912]) theory uses by contrast exclusively simple easily 
acceptable assumptions and is moreover compatible with all available data. 
When the primitive, in 19th century parlance, grow some plant, they use much 
empirical know-how transmitted from one generation to the next. But they 
also need to know why plants grow, wither and die. As this question cannot be 
answered empirically, they need to forge a “biological” theory to explain these 
familiar phenomena and draw it from the religious interpretation of the world 
available and treated as legitimate in their society. As to the magical practices, 
they are technical procedures derived from this biological theory. But magical 
practices are unreliable. Does not this show, as Lévy-Bruhl postulates, that 
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Durkheim’s Australians follow rules of inference diferent from ours, notably 
that they would be less sensitive to contradictions?
Durkheim’s Australians not only dislike contradiction, though. They treat 
it as modern scientists do: by inventing auxiliary assumptions. We know from 
the Duhem-Quine thesis that, when a theory fails to explain some data, the 
normal reaction of any scientist is to invent auxiliary assumptions rather than 
to reject the theory. For, as he does not know a priori which element in the 
theory is wrong, it is reasonable for him to assume that an auxiliary assump-
tion will likely reconcile the theory with the data. This is what scientists do, 
as the history of science shows. This is also what the magician does. In the 
case where his magical rituals fail, he will assume, say, that they have not been 
executed exactly as they should have been. 
Durkheim himself raises another objection: that, since they are ungrounded, 
magical practices fail in many cases. Why does not this fact weaken the credibi-
lity of magical theories, against Durkheim’s basic postulate that one should avoid 
to explain beliefs as the efects of illusions? Durkheim’s answer is that, as the rain 
rituals are practiced in the period of the year where rain is more likely to fall, a 
correlation between the two variables days with / without rituals and days with / without 
rain will be normally observed. The correlation will of course be spurious. But 
modern Westerners ground also many of their beliefs on spurious correlations.
On the whole, Durkheim’s explanation introduces exclusively easily accep-
table statements: either empirical statements as “the primitive are unaware of 
Western biology”, “the primitive dislike contradictions”, etc. or psychologi-
cal uncontroversial laws, as “in general people want to survive”, “rather than 
throwing away a theory that explains many things, people prefer to check 
whether it cannot be amended”. 
Moreover, Durkheim’s theory explains convincingly a number of puzzling 
data, as why magical practices were much more frequent in Europe in the 16th 
or 17th centuries than in the 14th century, and more frequent in the modern 
parts of Europe. It explains on the whole many comparative data, some of 
which have been discovered a long time after Durkheim (Boudon, 2012a, b). 
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An incidental point can be raised here: “analytical sociologists” talk of 
mechanisms to qualify statements as “in general people want to survive” or “rather 
than throwing away a theory that explains many things, people prefer to check 
whether it can be amended”. I must say that I do not see why we should not 
rather use, as Demeleunaere (2011) suggests, the classical concept of law.
6.3. NORMATIVE BELIEFS
I will illustrate now the use of the three-rule paradigm implicitly deining 
the so-called “analytical sociology” in the explanation of normative collective 
beliefs. I will irst use an example drawn from Adam Smith.
Adam Smith explains in his Wealth of Nations the feelings of fairness or 
unfairness the salaries of occupations arouse by making them the efect of 
strong reasons, in the sense that people would not easily see alternative more 
acceptable systems of reasons.
Why, he asks (Smith, 1976 [1793], chapter 10, p. 151-209), do we consider 
as normal that the public executioner is paid a relatively high salary? His quali-
ication is low. His job supposes a low level of formation and competence. He 
is – thanks God – strongly underemployed. But, as his job “is the most disgus-
ting of all”, a reasonably high salary should compensate this. In short, the 
Englishmen of Smith’ time found the salary of the public executioner justiied 
on the basis of acceptable reasons.
Some other diferences in salaries rest upon more complex systems of reasons. 
Thus, Smith’s contemporaries generally considered that coal miners should be 
paid a good salary, while they accepted that soldiers would receive a modest salary. 
Here again, Smith explains this collective belief by assuming that it derives from 
reasons that any ideal-typical Englishman of his time would have easily accepted. 
Here are these reasons. The two jobs require a low level of qualiication. 
It takes a short time to train a miner and a soldier. Both are exposed to the 
risk of death. But people interpret spontaneously the death of a miner as an 
accident, while they regard the death of a soldier as a sacriice for the sake of the 
homeland. Consequently, the soldier should be entitled to symbolic rewards 
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recognizing this sacriice. As the two jobs were in the 18th century comparable 
from the viewpoint of qualiication and exposure to risk, the principle equal 
contribution, equal reward required that miners receive a higher salary than soldiers, 
in compensation of the fact that, by contrast with soldiers, they were not entit-
led to glory and other symbolic goods. 
To use a concept proposed by Smith in his Theory of moral sentiments, the rela-
tive consensus emerging on the question as to whether a job should be more or 
less highly paid derives from the sets of reasons developed by impartial spectators, 
i.e. by ideal-typical individuals trying to igure out systems of reasons everybody 
would likely accept. The impartial spectator is a crucial notion in Smith’s Theory of 
moral sentiments that he uses implicitly in his later Wealth of nations. 
According to Smith’s analysis, people react the way they do when they learn 
that some type of job is paid the way it is, for reasons essentially of the cognitive type. 
This example seems to me of utmost importance for another reason: 
it shows that normative beliefs of the type “X is good, legitimate, etc.” can 
produce a consensus for objective reasons that all tend to accept because they 
are strong. Smith refutes here in advance the procedural theories that claim, 
as notably Habermas’, that good procedures are the necessary and suicient 
conditions of consensus on normative issues. Such theories ignore that good 
procedures can generate errors, as the history of science abundantly illustrate.
6.4. FEELINGS OF FAIRNESS
The three principles at the root of “analytical sociology” can satisfactorily 
explain the main empirical indings on the feelings of fairness. 
Thus, Forsé and Parodi (2004) and Forsé and Galland (2011) have shown 
in illuminating empirical studies that ideal-typical individuals clearly consi-
der some types of inequalities as acceptable and to no degree unfair, while 
they perceive others as illegitimate and unfair. Ideal-typical individuals do 
not perceive functional inequalities as inequitable: They easily recognize that 
rewards should be indexed on aptitudes, responsibilities, competence and / or 
contributions. They do not perceive either as unfair inequalities resulting 
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from the aggregation of free choices or decisions. Thus, they perceive the 
income of show business stars or popular sports men and women as abnor-
mally high, but not as unfair or inequitable, since it results from free indi-
vidual choices from the part of their fans or supporters. In principle, when 
the contributions of two individuals are of an identical value, they should be 
equally rewarded. But few people consider as unfair that two persons having 
the same job and executing the same tasks are unequally rewarded if they 
belong to unequally rich or dynamic irms or regions. Thus, if a plumber A 
is as competent as a plumber B but is employed by a irm confronted with 
serious economic diiculties, ideal-typical individuals would accept that his 
salary be lower even though his competence is the same. Ideal-typical indivi-
duals do not consider as unfair inequalities characterizing incommensurable 
activities. It is possible to argue with Adam Smith that miners should be paid 
more than soldiers, but it would be diicult, say, to argue that meteorologists 
should be paid more or less than lawyers. Ideal-typical individuals do not 
consider as unfair inequalities the origin of which is unknown or inequali-
ties that one cannot qualify as functional or not, i.e. as relecting diferences 
in competence or achievement. This is an important point, for an overall 
income distribution is the product – in unknown proportions – of functio-
nal inequalities, of dysfunctional inequalities, and of inequalities of which it 
is impossible to know whether they are functional or not. For this reason, 
according to some illuminating but unfortunately rare observations, people 
did not consider until the last years the reduction of the overall income distri-
bution as a major political objective. However, when global inequalities are as 
strong as in contemporary Western democracies, they cannot be held as func-
tional: this arouses a negative feeling in the mind of ideal-typical individuals. 
Finally, people consider inequalities that have the character of privileges as 
deeply unfair, as when a business leader who has led his irm to a decline is 
dismissed with high indemnities or when a political leader uses his position to 
generate illegitimate advantages to his own beneit.
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On the whole, once observations made by the social sciences on the rela-
tion between equity and equality are synthesized, they show that the public 
sees inequalities as fair or unfair on the basis of the cognitive equilibrium principle 
deining ordinary rationality. 
6.5. INCOME TAX
A third example drawn from Stein Ringen’s (2007) work will illustrate the 
role of the “analytical sociology” paradigm and of its cognitive equilibrium principle in 
the explanation of normative collective beliefs. By diference with the previous 
example, this one has the advantage of illustrating the cognitive process explai-
ning why long conlicts on political issues can inally been solved.
For a long period of time, democratic societies have struggled with the 
question as to whether and in which form an income tax should be intro-
duced. Following long political debates and conlicts, the income tax was dei-
ned as proportional. At a further stage, a consensus appeared on the idea that 
the notion of an income tax is a good one, that income tax should be progressive, 
that it should be moderately progressive. These three principles describe the situation 
currently prevailing in most Western democratic countries. To the exception of 
a few dissenting economists, they are widely accepted because ideal-typical indi-
viduals would easily recognize that strong reasons legitimate these principles.
These reasons are the following. Modern societies are roughly composed 
of three social classes. The three classes are: the rich, who have at their dispo-
sal a signiicant surplus which can be converted into political or social power 
(Boudon, 2005); the middle class, which enjoys a more or less important surplus 
but insuicient in size to convert it into political or social power; the poor.
Social cohesion, social peace, the principle of the dignity of all require 
that the poor beneit from a subsidy, from the middle class in the irst place, 
because of its numerical importance. However, the middle class would not 
accept to take its share if the rich would not accept to bear the load of subsidies 
to the poor to a greater extent than the middle class, and this in conformity 
with elementary principles of justice. It can be concluded from these reasons 
that income tax should be progressive. On the other hand, it must be mode-
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rately progressive, since the principle of eiciency would be violated if the tax 
was too brutally progressive, for the rich would then be incited to transfer their 
resources abroad, generating a loss for the national community.
So, one can legitimately conclude that the consensus on income tax results 
from a set of convincing reasons. Once he is suiciently informed, any citizen 
belonging to any of the social classes should accept the idea that a mode-
rately progressive income tax is a good thing. The validity of the argument 
is responsible for the consensus and its stability through time. Some citizens 
inluenced by their interests, prejudices or passions will likely be hostile to the 
idea, though. Some economists will dissent. But few people will follow them 
because they oversee the axiological dimension of the issue. An income tax 
that would be too brutally progressive would violate the principle of eiciency. 
The middle class would not consider a lat tax as fair.
6.6. LONG TERM EVOLUTION AS 
A PRODUCT OF ORDINARY RATIONALITY
The “analytical sociology” paradigm with its cognitive equilibrium prin-
ciple can also explain long-term trends. I come back briely to an already evoked 
example from Durkheim (1893). He has observed that a secular trend towards 
more lenient judiciary sentences characterizes Western societies. Also, civil 
rather than penal law treats an increasing number of types of misbehavior. 
And an increasing number of acts are prosecuted before lower-level courts. 
These long-term trends derive mainly from a basic process: when a 
new type of sentence appears as equally efective in terms of dissuasion as a 
former one, and also as better from some viewpoint, the ideal-typical indi-
vidual tends to accept and contributes to the selection of the new type of 
sentence. In other words, a basic two-stage mechanism is at work in this 
type of long-term processes, a rational selection of the innovations following 
the production of innovations. Durkheim has rightly maintained that some 
factors can facilitate this basic mechanism, as the increasing demographic 
density and the resulting increasing division of labor. 
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The previous analysis can be easily applied to our modern world. Death 
penalty tends to disappear from modern democratic societies notably because 
it has been repeatedly shown that its dissuasive power is controversial. It makes 
judiciary errors irreparable and is obviously cruel. Moreover, the indings of gene-
tic research make judiciary errors more easily detectable. In the long term these 
reasons lead ideal-typical individuals to prefer life sentencing to death penalty.
6.7. SOLVING RCT DEADLOCKS
The theory of rationality today prevalent in the social sciences is the 
so-called Rational choice theory. One of the important features of the Theory of ordi-
nary rationality is that it can solve easily many questions the Rational choice 
theory is unable to solve. I will just mention a few examples.
As game theory rests upon the Rational choice theory axioms, several situa-
tions of interaction have no “solution” in the sense that the Rational choice 
theory is unable to recommend any satisfactory line of action. The classical 
structures of the prisoner’s dilemma, the insurance game, the chicken game or the battle 
of the sexes have inspired a huge literature because they have no solution in the 
frame of the Rational choice theory. 
The best social thinkers and sociologists have understood though that the 
right “solution” is to take steps to the efect of modifying the structure, if this 
is feasible. Thus, Rousseau has well seen in his Discourse on the origin of inequalities 
that the way to solve an insurance game is to destroy the structure by introdu-
cing legal constraints. Olson has shown that collective action can be trapped 
in an n-person Prisoner’s dilemma structure, and that the solution is to destroy the 
structure by some innovation, as the closed shop or the production of selective 
incentives. The crossroads problem has no solution in the frame of the Rational choice 
theory, since Rational choice theory provides no way of choosing between 
the two Nash equilibriums generated by the problem. The solution is again to 
introduce an innovation in the form of a priority rule. The interesting side of 
Axelrod (1984) on the repeated prisoner’s dilemma game may not be that the 
TIT for TAT strategy provides a solution to the game, but rather that, if actor A 
cooperates in the irst move, this sends to B the signal that, if he cooperates, A 
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will likely go on cooperating in the following moves. In other words, Axelrod 
introduces implicitly the cognitive dimension of rationality beside its instru-
mental dimension: the players have cognitive reasons to prefer cooperation.
7. AT THE ROOT OF “ANALYTICAL SOCIOLOGY”
In a word, it can be shown that many sociologists from the classical to 
modern time have followed a paradigm deined by three major principles: 
methodological singularism, methodological individualism and the cognitive equilibrium principle. 
It states that the causes of individual actions and beliefs lie in the reasons people 
have to endorse them. More precisely, people endorse some representational or 
normative belief if they have the impression that their belief is grounded on a 
system of reasons that appears to them as better than any alternative system of 
reasons. As to their actions, they include always beliefs. 
Further topics would need an elaboration that I cannot undertake here: 
that most beliefs are context-dependent, but aim at being context-free. Or that 
representational as well as normative beliefs aim ideally at being context-free. 
I would also claim that, given its strength, the paradigm deined by the 
three major principles methodological singularism, methodological individualism and the 
cognitive equilibrium principle has been more or less clearly identiied in the history 
of sociology under various names: “comprehensive sociology” (Weber), 
“middle range theory” (Merton), or today “erklärende Soziologie” (H. Esser) and 
“analytical sociology” (P. Hedström et al.). Pawson (2009) has convincingly 
shown that the paradigm described by those three principles disentangles the 
meaning of “middle range theory”.
These remarks conirm, as Helga Nowotny (2011-2012) suggests, the rele-
vance of Michelle Lamont’s deinition of epistemological styles, “as a preference 
for particular ways of understanding how to build knowledge, as well as beliefs 
in the very possibility of proving those”. “In her study of evaluation cultures 
in the social sciences and humanities, comments Nowotny, she [Lamont] 
identiies a comprehensive, constructivist, positivist and utilitarian style. The 
comprehensive style is the dominant one, but typically the humanities shun 
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the positivist and utilitarian ones” (ibid., p. 1053). Of course, other deinitions of 
cognitive styles exist as do similar studies on the natural sciences. Nevertheless, 
it is a good starting point of recognizing the – also changing – prevalence of 
cognitive or epistemological styles”. I would simply add that, if the comprehen-
sive style is the dominant one, this is not without reasons.
I would even go further: the three-principle paradigm deines a particular 
type of sociology, the type of sociology that can be qualiied as “scientiic” 
in the sense that it proposes to explain any puzzling social phenomenon by 
making it the outcome of a set of not-puzzling laws and of factual statements. 
Now, explaining puzzling phenomena by making them the outcome of a set 
of not-puzzling laws and of factual statements is also exactly what any physi-
cist, biologist or astronomer does. 
All sociologists have obviously not followed and do not follow this para-
digm. I have evoked the contrast between the implicit conception of socio-
logy that Weber, Durkheim and many modern sociologists, as the few I have 
mentioned, illustrate and the holistic conception illustrated by Le Bon, or today 
Ulrich Beck or Zygmunt Bauman. Beside these two main types of sociology, 
several others could be listed, including the one I proposed myself in my inau-
gural lecture before the Academy of European Sociology (Boudon, 2001), where 
I identify three main types: explanatory, cameral and critical. Other categories 
could obviously be identiied. There is an often-fascinating descriptive sociology 
that, as stated by Runciman and Nedelmann (Commentaire, 2011-2012), explains 
that sociology can be closer to an art than a science. There is a critical sociology 
that tends to look for theories useful to some social category or political cause. 
There is a theoretical sociology canonically illustrated by Parsons’ Theory of social 
action or Lazarsfeld’s theory of empirical action, the core of which is represen-
ted by a relexive approach of sociological works that attempts to identify the 
criteria responsible for the fact that some work appears as more or less convin-
cing. There is a sociology that appears as impregnated by scientism (rather 
than by the scientiic ethos). Structural sociology, memetics or sociobiology, not 
to speak of the type of sociology that sees itself as an appendix of the neuros-
ciences illustrate Lamont’s positivist style: they have in common to suppose 
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that human behavior is the efect of “material” causes, i.e. of social, psycho-
logical or biological causes that, as the causes of digestion, would exclude any 
intervention of the human mind (Boudon, 2012 a, b and c). As Erner (2006) 
has brilliantly shown, French sociology of the 1970-1990’s owes its special 
lavor to the fact that it was mainly “critical” in the sense that it aimed at inspi-
ring compassion by making delinquent behavior or school dropping out the 
efects of social domination. Finally, a residual category can be identiied: words-
words-words sociology. On the whole, contemporary sociology gives the impression 
of being highly diverse. Unfortunately, this leads many handbooks to present 
sociological theories more or less as opinions and for this reason to juxtapose 
them as in commercial catalogues. The interest for “analytical sociology” is the 
symptom of the growing feeling of discomfort this situation arouses and of the 
consciousness that sociology can be and has been in many of its productions 
as scientiic as other disciplines.
I have the impression though that the handbooks on “analytical sociology” 
insist on secondary technical details and fail to identify clearly the common 
paradigm that underlies many illuminating sociological works, i.e. the para-
digm that I have tried to identify as grounded on three principles: methodological 
singularism, methodological individualism and the cognitive equilibrium principle. 
Author’s Note. Article originally presented as a communication at the Norwegian 
Cultural Center, Paris, January 5th, 2012.
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